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iona MAY - 1 A IQ: 3 s ' 
L1AY 0 1 2000 
SECURE COSiS 
GERAL~.£. FUERST, C!er~ cf ·:ourts 
~~~\fW~iT OF COMMON PLEAS 
CUYAHOG.iJY@illID'GA COUNTY, OHIO 
PER _t.U ________ ... _ Ct.PjTY_, 
CHARLES MURRAY, Administrator 
of the Estate of 
SAMUEL H. SHEPP ARD 
vs. 
STATE OF OHIO 
Defendant 
) 
) 
.. ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Judge Ronald Suster 
Case No. 312322 
l\:IOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOT\VITHST ANDING THE 
VERDICT 
/ 
Plaintiff, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby moves, pursuant to O.R.Civ. P. 
SO(B), for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial pursuant to 
O.R.Civ.P. 59(A) . The reasons and authorities in support of this motion are set forth in more 
detail in the attached brief in support. 
Respectfully submitted, 
-fulf,~ 
Terry H. Gilbert (0021948) 
George H. Carr (00693 72) 
13 70 Ontario Street, Suite 1700 
Cleveland, OH 44113 
(216) 241-1430 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
L Introduction 
On August 17, 1999, this Court granted Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend its 
Answer, allowing the State of Ohio to demand a jury trial in the above-captioned action. A jury 
trial was held from Febrnary 7, 2000, to April 12, 2000, after which time the jury began 
deliberations. Within three hours, the jury returned a verdict for Defendant. 
II. Law and Argument 
A. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
/ 
Judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a long-existing policy that requires courts to 
overturn jury verdicts in civil cases where a verdict has been based on erroneous or improper 
evidence, or would result in a miscarriage of justice. The test for granting judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is "the same as that for granting a motion for a directed verdict," 
Tex/er v. D.O. Summers Cleaners & Shirt Lazmd1y Co. (1998), 81 Ohio St. 3d 677, 679, 693 
N.E.2d 271, 273. Under this test, "the court must neither consider the weight of the evidence nor 
the credibility of the witnesses * * * 'if there is substantial competent evidence to support the 
party against whom the motion is made, upon which evidence reasonable minds might reach 
different conclusions, the motion must be denied."' Id., citing Strother v. Hutchinson (1981), 67 
Ohio St. 2d 282, 284-285, 423 N.E.2d 467, 469. 
The verdict here was a classic case of jury nullification. Despite overwhelming forensic 
evidence proving that Dr. Sheppard could not have committed this crime (much of which either 
was not seriously disputed or disregarded by the defense as "mumbo-jumbo"), this jury displayed 
no meaningful interest in deliberating after two months of testimony and the introduc~ion of 
hundreds of exhibits . The defense case was essentially a character assassination of Dr. Sheppard, 
portraying him as "the playboy of the Western world" who humiliated his wife by having an 
affair (which had ended four months prior to the murder of Mrs. Sheppard). Other than 
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suggesting that Dr. Sheppard's version of events was odd and suspicious, the defense presented 
no evidence that realistically refuted the preponderance of the evidence established by Plaintiff. 
Indeed, rather than dealing with the evidence explaining who committed the homicide of Mrs. 
Sheppard, the closing argument of the defense commenced by asking the jury "\Vhat kind of 
man was Dr. Sheppard?" Sadly, it was the "kind" of man, not the "kind" of evidence which 
dictated the result in this case. 
This Court attempted throughout the trial to remove evidence of character, prohibited by 
/ 
Ohio R.Evid. 404. However, although Plaintiff was severely limited in presenting compelling 
evidence of Richard Eberling's connection to the murder, in particular psychiatric histories 
and evidence of other crimes, including murder, committed by Richard Eberling, the Defendant 
was given carte blanche to portray Dr. Sheppard as a philanderer who had no respect for his wife, 
thereby rendering him more likely to kill his wife, or his account of events unworthy of belief. 
This lopsided admission of evidence showing character is precisely the kind of material that 
Article 4 of the Rules of Evidence was designed to prohibit: the jury decided the case based not 
on its evaluation of the evidence, but on its evaluation of the character of Dr. Sheppard. 
This trial scenario renders Ohio's wrongful-imprisonment statute an empty shell, in clear 
opposition to the policy and intent of the legislators who enacted it. To impose upon a jury the 
responsibility to determine the "preponderance of evidence of innocence," an inherently foreign 
and confusing concept to begin with, while subjecting the jurors to a frontal assault by the major 
law-enforcement institutions in the same jurisdiction from which jurors are drawn, essentially 
creates a no-win situation for any victim of wrongful imprisonment. The initial determination, 
tantamount to a declaratory judgment, by the Court of Common Pleas, was intended to be no 
more than a preliminary screening device to clear the way for compensation in the Court of 
Claims. It was never intended to create marathon jury trials where the victim of wrongful 
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imprisonment must confront a government prepared to spare no expense or manpower, 
politically or legally, to win the case. Add to the mixture the sordid history of community 
hysteria over the Sheppard case, and any disinterested observer would have serious questions 
about the reliability of this verdict. Indeed, those who closely watched this trial were shocked by 
the outcome and swiftness of the verdict. 
Accordingly, when the jury began deliberations at 1 :00 p.m., received the exhibits at 2:00 
p.m., requested a review of the instrnctions at 3:00 p.m., and indicated it had a verdict before 
/ 
4:30 p.m., it had obviously made up its collective mind before any meaningful review or 
deliberation. Can this Court feel confident that the jury really did its job - to discuss, review, 
analyze, weigh, and even debate a complex case involving over seventy witnesses and numerous 
complicated scientific issues? 
In hindsight, the question of possible undue influence on this jury must also be addressed 
including the following known incidents : (1) original panel juror no. 2 who mysteriously 
dropped out over the weekend following his selection, without indicating what transpired that 
changed his ability to be fair; (2) panel juror no. 3 who waited two weeks to accuse another juror 
of having formed a premature opinion, and yet on voir dire of the jury, no member conceded any 
impropriety, and (3) the still unpunished misconduct of Cuyahoga County Prosecutor William 
M_ason, who announced, in direct violation of this Court's order, a purported "settlement 
demand" from Plaintiff to the news media which at least one juror could not avoid seeing. 
While no court would want to consider the result of a two-month trial and be forced to 
conclude that the verdict cannot be supported by the evidence, or that the jury failed to perform 
its duty despite the faith that this community shares in the jury system, there are countless people 
in Cuyahoga County and around the world who are dumbfounded by \vhat happened in this case. 
Only a courageous Court can undo the latest mockery of justice in the Sheppard murder case. 
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B. New Trial 
In the alternative, this Court should grant Plaintiff a new trial. A new trial should be 
granted whenever "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the jury . .. or prevailing party, or any 
order of the court ... by which an aggrieved party was prevented from having a fair trial," Ohio 
R.Civ. P. 59(A)(l), or "in the sound discretion of the court for good cause shown," Ohio R.Civ. 
P. 59(A). In granting a new trial, 
the trial court is indeed endowed with a wide latitude of discretion in granting a 
new trial when he thinks the jury's verdict results in manifest injustice. This 
power is necessary to fulfill his function of maintaining general supervision over 
litigation to guard against miscarriages of justice which sometimes occur at the 
hands of juries. 
/ 
Jenkins v. Krieger (1981 ), 67 Ohio St. 2d 314, 320, 21 Ohio Op. 3d 198, 202, quoting Holland v. 
Brown (1964), 15 Utah 2d 422, 426, 394 P.2d 77. 
In considering a motion for new trial, the Court should first take into account the 
deliberative skill of the jury. The jury's decision in "a trial that is long and complicated and 
deals with a subject matter not lying within the ordinary knowledge of jurors ... should be 
scmtinized more closely" than a verdict in a simpler case where credibility, or other topics more 
familiar to jurors, are primary considerations. Lind v. Schenley Industries, Inc. (3d Cir. 1960), 
278 F.2d 79, 90-91. In fact, a trial court has the discretion to grant a new trial "if [the jury's] 
decision is so hasty as to indicate a flippant disregard of their duties." Val Decker Packing Co. v. 
Treon (2d Dist. 1950), 58 Ohio L.Abs. 545, 552. 
Here, the jury did not deliberate over the physical evidence in the case, or over the ten 
weeks of testimony and argument, at any great length. Because of this lack of gravity and 
seriousness about the decision before them, and for the other reasons stated above, it is 
appropriate for the Court to grant a new trial in which the evidence can be fully and thoroughly 
considered. 
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Further, "[a]rguments of counsel should be confined to the question in issue, and 
evidence received relating thereto, and if misconduct of counsel in argument improperly 
influences the jury, even though objection is not made or exception taken thereto, trial court 
should grant a new trial." Althouse Brown Jvfotor Co. v. Wilcox (7th Dist. 1935), 19 Ohio L.Abs. 
417, 419. Here, defense counsel in closing argument, drew improper inferences regarding the 
character of Dr. Sheppard, in violation of this Court's admission of evidence of marital strain for 
a narrowly limited purpose. This argument by the State ("What kind of man is Sam Sheppard?"), 
/ 
made it impossible for a jury to believe Dr. Sheppard's story, despite forensic evidence 
establishing his innocence. The Court should now confront its implicit reversal of its March 5, 
2000 order prohibiting evidence of marital infidelity as improperly prejudicial, and conclude that 
the jury was improperly influenced by this evidence. 
For both of these reasons, the fa ilure of the jury to deliberate at length, and the improper 
conduct by defense counsel in closing argument, good cause exists for a new trial pursuant to 
Ohio R.Civ. P. 59(A). 
C. Jurv Trial 
In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the jury's decision, the Court should reconsider its 
rnling that the State is entitled to a jury trial in this matter. As was previously argued in 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Leave to File an Amended 
Answer, the State is not entitled to a jury in a statutory action such as a wrongful-imprisonment 
suit, and the Defendant waived its right to demand a jury by attempting to demand one over two 
years after the start of litigation. Moreover, the question of innocence is a complex legal 
decision that cannot be met in the face of vigorous state advocacy in front of a jury composed of 
voters and citizens in ajurisdiction under scrntiny for denying justice. For all of these reasons, 
as well as those argued by Plaintiff in more detail in its Memorandum on this issue, this Court 
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• 
committed reversible error in allowing a jury trial in this matter, and should now grant Plaintiff a 
new trial, to be held by this Court. 
III. Conclusion 
·wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully moves this court to enter judgment for Plaintiff 
notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, to hold a new trial, to be conducted by the 
Court without a jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
- ~J /A £J!c:~f 
Teny H. GiHSert (0021948) 
George H. Carr (0069372) 
1370 Ontario Street, Suite 1700 
Cleveland, OH 44113 
(216) 241-1430 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment 
/ 
Notwithstanding the Verdict has been served on William Mason, Prosecuting Attorney, Justice 
Center, 9th Floor, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113 on this_)_ day of /!:7' , 
2000. ~ . 
~- ; J_ iJf!l,t I • /1/'? 'I ,' -.>. tH . - ·7~. t') ·'-1 
Teny H. Gilbert · 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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